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Abstract 
Following on from the seminal works by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), many methods have been proposed to 
measure wage discrimination against women. Some of these methods focus on the entire distribution of the 
discrimination experienced by each woman, underlining a common aspect of poverty and discrimination analysis: the 
latter two are both based on an idea of deprivation which originates from a poverty line (in the case of poverty) and 
from the expected wage in the absence of discrimination (in the case of wage discrimination) (Jenkins, 1994; Del Río et 
al., 2011). These approaches hinge on conditional-to-individual-characteristics expected wages, lacking in any focus 
regarding the entire conditional wage distribution faced by each woman. 
In this paper we will discuss an expected utility approach to the study of wage discrimination. Adjusted and 
unadjusted for discrimination conditional-to-individual-characteristic wage distributions are evaluated for each woman 
by means of a utility function. And, in order to evaluate the presence and the discrimination intensity, these distributions 
will be compared on the basis of the respective certainty equivalent wages. As the choice of the utility function affects 
the results of the analysis, we will also evaluate the share of women for which the adjusted for discrimination 
conditional wage distribution second-order stochastically dominates the un-adjusted distribution. Finally, an empirical 
analysis will be performed for the Italian labour market. 
1. Introduction 
The classic approach to the measurement of wage discrimination in the labour market is that of the 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (B-O) (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973), where the gender wage 
differential is decomposed into a part explained by gender differences in endowments (human 
capital characteristics and other control variables) and a residual part, which is usually interpreted 
as discrimination. This decomposition employs estimates from log-wage regression models, which 
are separately estimated for the two genders, decomposing the gender difference in the log 
geometric mean wage as follows: 
log− log
 =  −
′ +
′  −
 (1)
where  and  are estimated coefficients for the male and female log wage regression models 
respectively, and  and  are vectors of mean individual characteristics for the male and the 
female group respectively. The explanatory variables used in the log wage regression models are 
the same of those of the  and  vectors. The first part of the decomposition is the so-called 
explained part and the second refers to the unexplained part, usually attributed to discrimination. 
As the B-O decomposition measures discrimination at mean values of individual characteristics, 
the unexplained part of the B-O decomposition allows for the numerical compensation of individual 
discrimination between discriminated and non-discriminated women, thus providing the same 
evaluation for very different distributions of discrimination experienced. To overcome this issue 
Jenkins (1994) and Del Río et al. (2011) have suggested a distributional approach. According to this 
approach, the entire distribution of discrimination experienced by each woman is evaluated on the 
basis of discrimination indices which satisfy properties borrowed from poverty analysis. While 
poverty hinges on the concept of income deprivation, discrimination can be conceived as the 
deprivation of wage from the non-discriminative wage. 
This approach raises two issues: 1) how to evaluate the individual discrimination experienced by 
each woman; and 2) how to aggregate individual discrimination in a single index. In the 
distributional approach, individual discrimination is evaluated by comparing the unadjusted 
expected wage with the expected wage in the absence of discrimination, that is, the expected wage a 
woman would receive if she were paid like a man (the expected wage in the absence of 
discrimination has the role of a counterfactual wage in the analysis). According to Del Río et al. 
(2011), individual discrimination can be summarized in an index which is based on the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke (1984) class of poverty indices; this index depends on an aversion-to-
discrimination parameter. When this parameter is zero, the index refers to the share of discriminated 
women, that is, the share of women for which the expected wage in the absence of discrimination is 
greater than the unadjusted expected wage. When the parameter is not zero, the index measures the 
discrimination intensity. Other approaches also focus on the entire distribution of individual 
discrimination experienced but they differ in the method used to derive the counterfactual 
distribution of wage (Machado and Mata, 2005; Fortin and Lemieux, 1998; DiNardo et al., 1996; 
Favaro and Magrini, 2008). 
The approach we propose in this paper is based on expected utility theory. Using a constant 
relative risk aversion utility function, we can compare the unadjusted conditional-to-individual-
characteristics wage distribution of each woman to the counterfactual distribution, which is 
obtained by assuming that she is paid as a man. Unlike the distributional approaches by Jenkins 
(1994) and Del Río et al. (2011), our focus does not regard the conditional mean wage but the entire 
conditional distribution. A similar approach has been employed by Van Kerm (2010), where the 
conditional-to-individual-characteristics wage distribution is assumed to follow a Singh-Maddala 
distribution (Singh and Maddala, 1976; Kleiber and Kotz, 2003; Biewen and Jenkins, 2005). In 
contrast to Van Kerm (2010), we assume that conditional wage distributions are log-normally 
distributed. The expected utility approach is also used in poverty analysis to provide risk-adjusted 
poverty measures (Makdissi and Wodon, 2003; Cruces and Wodon, 2007). The log-wage model 
employed in our analysis contains a heteroscedastic error term and we will be proposing a solution 
to take this aspect into account. 
Stochastic dominance is another concept employed in our analysis. When distribution 
 second-
order stochastically dominates distribution , then the expected utility related to distribution 
 is 
greater than the expected utility of distribution  for every concave utility function. We enrich our 
statistical analysis by providing the share of women for which the conditional wage distribution in 
the absence of discrimination second-order stochastically dominates the unadjusted conditional 
distribution. This share describes how many women are discriminated against, independently of the 
chosen concave utility function. An assessment of discrimination testing for stochastic dominance 
has been used by Millimet and Wang (2006). 
This Paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the proposed approach and derives the 
discrimination indices. Section 3 outlines the theoretical underpinning to the relationship between 
segregation and wage differential. Section 4 describes an empirical analysis, where our approach is 
applied (also describing our adopted estimation strategy), and an evaluation of the effect of 
segregation on the gender wage differential. Section 5 makes concluding comments.  
2. The certainty equivalent wage and stochastic dominance for measuring wage 
discrimination 
The wage equation model we consider is the following: 
log = ′  + 									~0;	2 								 = ,
 (2)
where "# is the hourly wage of individual  of gender  ( =  for male and  = 
 for female), "# is his/her vector of individual characteristics, " is the parameter-vector of coefficients and "# 
is the random component. 
As the random variable log"#, conditional on individual characteristics, is normally 
distributed, the "# random variable has a log-normal distribution. We allow for heteroscedasticity 
in model (2), assuming that the variance of the erratic component "# can differ among observations, 
according to individuals’ characteristics. More generally, we can assume that every conditional-to-
individual-characteristics quantile $%"#|'(, of the order ), can be expressed as a function of the 
explanatory variables: $)|'( = ′ ) (3)
We adopt a common utility function for wage, defined as: 
*+ = , +1−.1 − . , /	. ≠ 1log	+, /	. = 1 1 
(4)
where + is the received wage and . is a risk aversion parameter. This is a constant relative risk 
aversion utility function: when . < 0 it represents a risk-loving utility function while when . > 0 it 
refers to a risk-averse type. As we want to furnish an aggregate measure of discrimination using this 
utility function, and this measure aims at providing a social assessment of discrimination in the 
labour market, we prefer to use . > 0, thereby assuming that most people are risk-averse. 
The expected utility function for individual  of gender  is: 
4.Λ =
678
79 : +1−.1 − .;Λ+;++∞0 , /	. ≠ 1: log	+;Λ+;++∞0 , /	. = 1
1
 
(5)
where Λ"#∙ is the log-normal conditional cumulative distribution function of the wage of an 
individual  of gender . The certainty equivalent wage >?"#, that is, that wage that an individual 
would view as equally desirable to his/her risky wage, can be obtained by solving the equation *>?"# = 4?"#Λ"#: >. = @AB C′  + 1/21 − .2 E (6)
The discrimination measures we wish to define are based on the definition of the adusted-for-
discrimination certainty equivalent wage. It is the certainty equivalent wage of a women facing a 
wage distribution with male parameters, which is conditional to her characteristics. Thus, this 
theoretical wage is the certainty equivalent wage a woman would obtain if she were not 
discriminated: F. = @AB C
′  + 1/21− .2 E (7)
Thus a woman can be defined as being discriminated against if F?# > >?#, that is, if the certainty 
equivalent wage is higher in the absence of discrimination than her unadjusted certainty equivalent 
wage. 
A relative measure of discrimination experienced by a woman can be obtained as: 
;. = F. − >.
F.  (8)
This measure can be used to obtain the following discrimination index: 
G. = 1/
H ;.
=1  (9)
where  is the number of women in the analysis. 
The values of ;?#, and accordingly the resulting G?, depend on the chosen risk aversion 
parameter .. It would be of interest to know if a woman can be considered as being discriminated 
against for each value of . > 0, so that her discrimination status does not depend on the analyst’s 
subjective choice of .. The requisite concept is that of second order stochastic dominance (Quirk 
and Saposnik, 1962; Hadar and Russell, 1969; Hanoch and Levy, 1969; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 
1970, 1971). Formally, given two probability distributions 
 and , distribution 
 stochastically 
dominates  in the second order sense (
	SSD	) if and only if the expected utility 4
 of 
 is 
greater or equal to the expected utility 4 of  for all utility functions *∙ ∈ L, employed in the 
calculation of the expected utilities (with strict inequality for some *∙), where L is the set of 
utility functions with ;*A/;A > 0 and ;M*A/;AM < 0. According to a theorem by Levy 
(1973), which is valid in the context of log-normal distributions, the log-normal distribution with 
parameters #N ; #M  second-order stochastically dominates that of parameters #N ; #M  if 
and only if all the following conditions hold: 
68
9 
′  ≥ 
′ 
2 ≤ 
2
′  −
′ 
 ≥ 1/2
2 − 2 
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(10)
In order to enrich the information provided by the discrimination measure G. we define the 
following index: 
 = Q
  (11)
where: 
Q = R1, if	Λ	SSD	Λ
0, otherwise 1 (12)
Thus, the index  describes the share of women which can be considered as being discriminated 
against according to all utility functions of type (4) with . > 0, for which ;*A/;A > 0 and ;M*A/;AM < 0. 
3. Relationship between segregation and wage differential 
Occupational segregation is generally understood as the segmentation of occupations (or sectors of 
economic activity) on the basis of workers’ gender (Anker, 1997; James and Taeuber, 1985). The 
classic measure to overall segregation is the segregation index by Duncan and Duncan (1955), 
which measures the dissimilarity between the distribution of the two genders among occupations. 
Many other measures have been proposed in the literature in attempting to solve specific 
methodological issues (Moir and Selby-Smith, 1979; Karmel and MacLachlan, 1988; Hutchens, 
2004). Desirable properties of segregation indices have also been described by Hutchens (2001). 
The phenomenon of segregation can be due to: employers’ practices (Becker, 1957), gender 
differences in human capital endowments, labour market forces (Blau and Jusenius, 1976), personal 
constraints (for example, household responsibilities as regards childcare and care for the elderly) 
and preferences. Other definitions of segregation can be offered which hinge on the source of 
segregation itself. For example, one could be interested in measuring that part of segregation which 
cannot be explained by human capital characteristics, that is, the segregation due to occupational 
discrimination (Åslund and Skans, 2005, 2007; Kalter, 2000). Another common distinction is that 
between horizontal and vertical segregation, where the latter most properly refers to the different 
distribution of men and women among occupations with various degrees of skill, responsibility or 
payment (Hakim, 1981, Watts, 2005). Vertical segregation can be explained by the presence of 
glass ceiling, a subtle but pervasive barrier to the advancement of women in the career ladder. 
Clearly, there is a relationship between segregation and wage differentials, as the more women 
are concentrated in poorly paid occupations, the lower their mean wage is. A theory explaining 
aspects of segregation and wages is provided by the overcrowding hypothesis by Bergmann (1971, 
1974). If the labour market consists of sector A and sector B, and employers discriminate women in 
sector A (in the sense that they prefer to employ men), then women will move to sector B and thus 
‘overcrowd’ it. This supply pressure will deflate wages in sector B, while inflating wages in sector 
A, thereby reducing the mean wage of women (who are more concentrated in the low-paid sector 
B). As men and women are equally paid when they are in the same sector, it should be noticed that 
there is no wage discrimination in either sector A or sector B and discrimination in employment is 
the source of the wage differential. 
4. Estimation strategy and empirical analysis 
4.1 Data and variables 
The data used in the empirical analysis has been taken from the European Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (Eu-Silc) 2006 data set for Italy1. The sample employed in the analysis includes 
8,559 male and 6,684 female employees. Explanatory variables used in the estimation of the log 
hourly wage equations are: years of education, years of work experience, the square of years of 
work experience, weekly worked hours, occupation (dummy variables set with ‘elementary 
occupations’ as reference category, using the one digit ISCO-88 COM classification of 
occupations), economic activity (dummy variables set with ‘agriculture, hunting and forestry’ as 
reference category, using the NACE Rev. 1.1 classification of economic activities) and region of 
residence (dummy variables north and centre with the south as reference category). 
4.2 Testing for the log-normality of conditional wage distributions 
The first step in the analysis is to assess the log-normality of the conditional-to-individual-
characteristics hourly wage; this is equivalent to assessing the normality of the conditional-to-
individual-characteristics log-hourly wage. In order to perform this step, we can take advantage of 
the well-known probability integral transformation theorem, in the way it was also employed by 
Machado and Mata (2005). According to this theorem, the random variable 
[\4 has distribution 
, given a cumulative distribution 
 and a uniformly distributed random variable 4, defined as  [0; 	1]. For each gender  = , 
, we generate a random sample _)` a`b\c  of size d = 300 from a 
uniformly distributed population with parameters [0; 	1]. Thereafter, we estimate d = 300 quantile 
values of order )`  by using quantile regression analysis (Koenker and Bassett , 1978); the quantile 
values are conditional to several combinations of regressors. This obtains f$g%h"#|'(i`b\c  , which 
represents a simple random sample (of size d = 300) from the estimated conditional distribution $g%h"#|'( , that is, the estimated conditional quantile of order )` . Finally, we use these samples 
to graphically test distribution normality by means of standardized normal probability plots. 
Clearly, it is not possible to test the normality of the log-wage variable for every combination of 
regressors and we have, therefore, chosen only 24 combinations we consider significant and 
reported them in Table 2. In defining the combinations reported in Table 2, we have considered 
                                                 
1
 Official code of the data set: IT-SILC XUDB 2006 –April 2008 
various levels of explanatory variables. Two levels for education and experience have been 
considered: the first level L is given by the mean value of the variable minus one standard 
deviation; the second level H is the mean value of the same variable plus one standard deviation. 
Mean values and standard deviations are separately calculated by gender. We have defined three job 
categories: job category A is composed of plant and machine operators, and assemblers employed 
in the industry sector; category B contains public sector clerks; and category C comprises industry 
managers. We have considered two regions, the north and the south of Italy, omitting the central 
regions. The value for weekly worked hours has been set to the mean value of the whole sample, 
that is, the sample including men and women. 
Figure 1 shows the standardized normal probability plots of the log-wage distributions, 
conditional on the aforementioned 24 regressor combinations, calculated for the male sample; 
Figure 2 describes the results for the female sample. From observing these plots, we can generally 
positively conclude the assumption of the normality of the conditional log-wage and, as a 
consequence, the log-normality of the conditional wage, even if some distributions do not appear to 
be normally distributed. These results support the application of methods and formulae from 
Section 2 with sufficient approximation. 
4.3 Estimating conditional standard deviation 
The second step in the analysis is the estimation of the conditional to individual characteristic 
standard deviation of the erratic component of the log-wage models. If "#~0;	j"#M  then log"#|"#~"#N "; 	j"#M , while j"#M  depends on the levels of regressors, as is implicit in (3). 
From standard statistical theory, is well-known that the difference between the mean and the 
quantile corresponding to the inflection point of a normal distribution is the standard deviation of 
the distribution, and we can thus exploit this property by defining a simple consistent estimator for "#: kj"l# = 1/2m$gno\"#|'( − $gn[\"#|'(p (13)
where Φ∙ is the standard normal cumulative function, Φ+1 ≅ 0.841 and Φ−1 ≅ 0.159. 
Regression coefficient estimates of the models explaining the log-wage quantile of order Φ+1 
and log-wage quantile of order Φ−1 are reported in Table 1. 
Indeed, many consistent estimators for the same parameter could be defined, as for example $gno\"#|'( − $gx.y"#|'(, therefore the choice is quite arbitrary. A non-parametric 
approach could be the calculation of the standard deviation based on the simulated log-wage 
distribution, conditional on to the individual characteristics of each observation in the sample. This 
estimation strategy would be very computer-intensive because 8,559 distributions for men and 
6,684 distributions for women would need to be estimated in our analysis. It is, therefore, preferable 
to use this approach only for the log-wage distributions which are conditional to the our 24 
combinations of regressor values. We display the corresponding estimates kj"z# of the simulated 
approach in Table 2 to compare them with the alternative kj"l# estimates. No significant differences 
have emerged in the comparisons between the two estimators and we interpreted that as partial 
evidence for the validity of our approach. 
From Table 2 we can observe a positive, albeit small, effect of education and experience on 
standard deviation. Industry managers display the greatest standard deviation but it is considerably 
reduced in the case of high educational level and experience. In most cases men demonstrate greater 
standard deviation than is the case with women and this occurs mainly when considering kj"z# 
estimates. The standard deviation relating to the south as the region of residence is greater than that 
for other regions. 
4.4 Evaluating wage discrimination 
The final step in the analysis is to estimate >?# and F?# in order to estimate the discrimination 
measures G? and  and thus evaluate discrimination in the Italian labour market. Consistent 
estimators for >?# and F?# are the following respectively: >.
 = @AB C
′ 
 + 1/21 − .{
$2 E (14)
and F. = @AB C
′  + 1/21 − .{$2 E (15)
where  and  are OLS estimates for the regression coefficents of equation (2) for the male and 
the female group respectively. Using >|?# and Fg?#, we can construct consistent estimators G? and |, 
for G? and  respectively, which are simply based on formulas (9) and (11). 
Table 3 shows the values of estimated G?, when different values of the aversion parameter . are 
used, according to educational level, years of work experience and region. These variables were 
employed in the analysis to evaluate the degree of discrimination for different levels of human 
capital characteristics and residency regions. For example, this analysis could provide insights for 
evaluating if more or less educated women are prone to be discriminated against or if a region is 
more unfavorable to women than another. 
The value for the G?	index was 0.114 when the discrimination evaluation was based on the 
aversion-value . = 1. An interpretation of this result is that the adjusted-for-discrimination 
certainty equivalent wage is, on average, higher than 11.4%, than the unadjusted certainty 
equivalent wage. In other words, the certainty equivalent wage relating to the conditional wage 
distribution which women would have if they were not discriminated against is, on average, 11.4% 
higher than the value for the conditional wage distribution they currently enjoy. It is worth noting 
that this evaluation is not based on the mean values of the adjusted and unadjusted for 
discrimination conditional wage distributions, but on the corresponding whole distributions, and 
thus this can be considered a distributional approach. Moreover, this approach takes into account 
the risk-dimension of wage, which is neglected by other distributional approaches. 
Many values of the risk-aversion parameter could be used. We have limited our analysis by 
using values corresponding to risk-averse utility functions. The G? 	index value only ranges 
marginally, from 0.147 to 0.149, when the risk-aversion parameter ranges from . = 1 to . = 4. The 
greatest variation, which was determined by a change in the risk-aversion parameter, occurred for 
the south of Italy, where the G? index range from 0.114 to 0.137. 
The discrimination intensity generally increases with increasing working experience, and this is 
probably a consequence of the presence of a glass ceiling effect on the Italian labour market (see 
U.S. Glass Ceiling Commission (1995) for a definition of glass ceiling). Thus, women’s wages 
decline as compared with men’s with equal human capital endowments during career progression. 
Education plays an inverse role on the discrimination experienced by women, as increasing 
educational level is associated with a reduction in discrimination. By taking into account the 
empirical relationship which was observed between education and discrimination, we could suppose 
that this phenomenon might assist women to reduce future discrimination because increasing 
numbers of female graduates are entering the labour market. 
While the evaluation of discrimination ranged from 0.155 to 0.145 for the north and from 0.156 
to 0.165 for the center, the value for the G? index went from 0.114 to 0.137 for the south. Thus, 
discrimination in the south appears to be less than that for other regions. Finally, it is interesting to 
note that the south of Italy provides researchers with an unusual case where the gender wage 
differential is in favor of women (the unadjusted average difference for the hourly wage is -0.227 
euros). 
Table 4 shows the share of women, who are second order stochastically dominated, by 
educational level, experience and region. This numerical analysis is not intended to provide a 
measure of the intensity of discrimination, but statistical information which could be 
complementary to results for the G? index and provide easily interpretable statistical information. 
The overall value for Italy of 0.440 means that 44% of Italian women are discriminated against in 
the sense that they would prefer to be paid as they were men, and this is true for every aversion 
parameter . > 0 of the utility function. The south of Italy has the greatest share of second-order 
stochastically dominated women, while the G? index reveals that the south is characterized by the 
least degree of discrimination. These results suggest how multifaceted the analysis of discrimination 
can be and the pervasive effects of discrimination, despite its possibly low intensity. 
The discrimination analysis was conducted by means of calculating the shares of women, who 
are second-order stochastically dominated, by educational level and experience. The results 
revealed a similar pattern to those found for the G? index. Indeed, education once again reduces 
wage discrimination while experience generally tends to favor it. The latter phenomenon could be 
interpreted as a clue to the presence of a glass ceiling effect against women in the Italian labour 
market. 
4.5 Effects of segregation on wage differential 
In this sub-section we will attempt to evaluate how segregation can have an impact on the gender 
wage differential in the Italian labour market. 
The Treiman and Hartman (1981) decomposition (T-H) provides a rough measure of the impact 
of segregation on the gender wage differential. This decomposition has two variants which 
decompose the same absolute wage differential into an inter-occupational component, that is, the 
part explained by the different distribution of men and women among occupations or sectors, and 
the intra-occupational component, that is, the part explained by gender wage differentials in 
occupations or sectors. We can label the first variant as decomposition A, which is defined as: 
 −
 = }′ ~ −~
+ } −}
′~
 (16)
and the second as decomposition B, defined as: 
 −
 = }
′ ~ −~
+ } −}
′~ (17)
where ~ and ~ are the column vectors of the relative frequencies of men and women in 
occupations (or sectors) respectively and } and } are the column vector of mean wages in 
occupations (or sectors) respectively. The inter-occupational component is given by }N ~ − ~ 
in decomposition A and by }N ~ − ~ in decomposition B; the intra-occupational component is 
given by } −}N~ in decomposition A and by } −}N~ in decomposition B. 
In order to understand the T-H decomposition, is useful to pay attention to two extreme labour 
market configurations. When ~ = ~, no segregation is present in the labour market and the wage 
differential is entirely explained by wage differences inside occupations; conversely the wage 
differential is fully explained by segregation when } = }. 
In terms of computation, we notice that the T-H decomposition is a B-O decomposition where 
the separately estimated by sex regression wage models do not contain the constant term and all 
explanatory variables are occupational dummies. Mean wages } and } correspond to the 
estimated beta coefficients of the B-O decomposition and ~ and ~ correspond to the vector of 
mean individual characteristics of the B-O decomposition. 
We can use the T-H decomposition to provide an initial and approximate picture of the effect 
of occupational segregation on the gender wage differential in the Italian labour market. Table 6 
reports the results of the T-H decomposition (versions A and B), using occupations and economic 
sectors, applying it to Italy and its macro-regions. Both occupational and sector analyses reveal that, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, segregation has a positive impact on the relative-to-male mean, 
female wage (estimates of the inter-occupational components are all negative). For example, the 
absolute difference between male and female mean wage in Italy is 0.641 euros; according to the T-
H decomposition, the effect of the differences in wage inside occupations is 1.157 euro while -0.516 
is the effect of segregation. This result can be approximately interpreted in the following way: the 
wage differential would be 0.516 in favour of women if there were no gender wage differences 
inside occupations. Indeed, it must be stressed that this methodology does not control for human 
capital endowments and it does not provide clear information regarding discrimination. However, 
these results provide an initial glance about the impact of segregation on wages.  
In order to enhance our understanding about the relationship between segregation and wage 
differentials, we can analyze the relation between male mean wage in occupations (or sectors of 
economic activities) and the female representation ratio, calculated as: 
FF = 
//
/ (18)
where 
# is the number of female employees in occupation (sector) , # is the total number of 
workers (men and women) in occupation (sector) , 
 is the total number of female employees in 
the labour market and  are the total number of employees in the whole labour market. The 
relationship between the mean wage of male workers (assumed to be the non-discriminatory group) 
and the female representation ratio in occupations (sectors) are plotted in Figure 5. No clear 
relationship appears between the two measures and we can, therefore, consider this as indicator of 
the not negative impact of segregation on wage differentials. Anker (1998) classifies occupations as 
male dominated (
FF# ≤ 0.5), gender integrated (0.5 < 
FF# < 1.5) or female dominated (
FF# ≥1.5), and thus we can conclude that occupations and sectors in Italy are almost all gender integrated 
and female dominated. Low levels of segregation in the labour market have also been observed by 
the European Commission (2009a, 2009b). Integrated labour markets do not only have positive 
features. Bettio (2002) has discussed the negative relationship between segregation and the female 
employment rate in the European labour market, in which the advantages of the low level of 
occupational segregation in Italy is counterbalanced by the disadvantages of its low female 
employment rate. 
In order to provide a more complete picture of the impact of segregation on wage differentials 
and discrimination, we repeat our wage discrimination analysis in an expected utility approach 
using a reduced set of explanatory variables in the wage equations. The reason for this estimation 
choice lay in the opportunity to hold constant only the variables that are not determined by the 
underlying discrimination process, as highlighted by Cain (1986); we have, therefore, omitted 
occupational dummies, sector dummies and weekly worked hours. This estimation strategy is the 
same used in the seminal paper by Oaxaca (1973), where a full-scale model and a personal 
characteristics model are estimated. For the effect of the inclusion of occupational dummies and the 
choice of the occupational aggregation level on estimated discrimination, see Kidd and Shannon 
(1996). 
The explanatory variables included in the reduced models are: years spent in education, length of 
work experience in years, the square of years of work experience and regional dummies (the north 
and center of Italy, with the south as a reference). Table 7 shows the estimated standard deviation of 
the erratic component of the reduced quantile model for eight regressor combinations. In order to 
form these combinations we used two educational levels (low and high) and two levels of work 
experience (low and high), as defined in Section 4.2; only the north and south levels relating to the 
region categorical variable were used. Standard deviations are estimated by means of the kj"l# and kj"z#	estimators. A high degree of normality condition was observed for the male case: the null-
hypothesis of normality was not refused in seven cases out of eight, according to the Shapiro-Wilk 
(1965) normality test at a 5% significance level. However, the results of the application of this test 
are merely indicative because the sample obtained through the use of the integral transformation 
theorem cannot be considered to be a proper a simple random sample from the true underlying 
distribution; indeed, the sample is obtained by using an estimated (and, therefore, not true) inverse 
cumulative probability distribution. Standardized normal probability plots for simulated male log-
wage distributions, shown in Figure 3, confirm the accurate approximation to normal distribution. 
The same cannot be said for female distributions (see Figure 4), which are negatively skewed, 
displaying higher deviation from normality. Furthermore, the estimates kj"l# and kj"z# appear to be 
quite different from each other and we can interpret this as a consequence of the non-normality of 
distributions. In spite of this result, the discrimination indices G? and  were estimated and results 
displayed in Table 8 and 9 respectively The discrimination index G? appeared generally lower than 
that calculated using the full models and we interpreted this as a positive effect of segregation on 
the gender differences in wages. However, a complementary picture is provided by the second-
order stochastically dominated share of women, according to reduced models (Table 9), which is 
often 100% in the sub-samples under analysis. It can, therefore, be stated that discrimination against 
women remains a pervasive phenomenon, but its intensity is lower than the discrimination 
measured by using the full set of variables. 
5. Conclusion 
The expected utility approach is based on the estimation of two conditional-to-individual-
characteristics wage distributions for each woman in the sample: the unadjusted distribution and the 
adjusted for discrimination distribution. Discrimination emerges from the comparison between the 
two conditional distributions, while other methods for evaluating discrimination hinge on the 
conditional expected wages only. Conditional distributions are compared on the basis of certainty 
equivalent wages, that is, the wage which make an individual indifferent between that wage and the 
risky conditional distribution. This comparison is based on an expected utility function which is 
assumed to be the same for each individual. 
Although evaluating discrimination according to the expected utility approach depends on the 
chosen utility function, this approach provides us with a wealth of information, for two reasons: 1) 
individuals are not only interested in the expected wage but in the entire distribution, and other 
moments of the distribution can affect their utility, thus a utility approach is useful for analyzing 
discrimination; and 2) many utility functions can be employed in the same analysis, making explicit 
the socially, evaluative choice of the researcher. The second-order stochastic dominance criterion 
provides further information regarding discrimination, permitting us to estimate the share of women 
who are discriminated against regardless of the chosen concave utility function. We suggest using 
this as auxiliary information in the analysis but we would like to underline that it does not measure 
discrimination intensity. 
Our method works well when conditional to individual characteristic wage distribution are log-
normally distributed. We have tested this distribution form and established that it can be often 
assumed with reasonable approximation. However, we are of the opinion that the choice of the most 
appropriate theoretical distribution is a matter of judgment. Nevertheless, the expected utility 
approach is quite flexible and we believe it can be applied by assuming different wage distributions 
or a non-parametric framework. The empirical analysis for the Italian labour market revealed some 
interesting findings: 1) female discrimination increases with work experience and we interpreted 
this as a consequence of the glass ceiling; 2) the impact of discrimination is inversely linked with 
educational level and we consider this as progress for women as their educational level is currently 
increasing; 3) the Italian labour market conceals considerable regional differences; 4) segregation 
and discrimination in employment have less impact than pure wage discrimination; and 5) 
discrimination intensity and the diffusion of discrimination (measured by the share of discriminated 
against women) are two different viewpoints, both of which should be monitored. 
 
Tables 
Table 1 – Estimations of the coefficients for the full regression models  
  men  women 
 Φ+1 Φ−1 OLS  Φ+1  Φ−1 OLS 
education  0.0285*** 0.0196*** 0.0263***  0.0271*** 0.0237 *** 0.0244 *** 
  (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0014)  (0.0018) (0.0021 ) (0.0015 ) 
experience  0.0276*** 0.0333*** 0.0316***  0.0157*** 0.0268 *** 0.0210 *** 
  (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0013)  (0.0019) (0.0021 ) (0.0017 ) 
experience (squared)  -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0005***  -0.0001** -0.0004 *** -0.0003 *** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0001) (0.0001 ) (0.0000 ) 
weekly hours worked   -0.0097*** -0.0113*** -0.0102***  -0.0125*** -0.0067 *** -0.0097 *** 
  (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0007)  (0.0006) (0.0008 ) (0.0006 ) 
occupation 1  0.7407*** 0.3246*** 0.5031***  0.5923*** 0.3292 *** 0.5233 *** 
  (0.0400) (0.0429) (0.0398)  (0.0494) (0.0582 ) (0.0607 ) 
occupation 2  0.5283*** 0.3449*** 0.3888***  0.4528*** 0.3897 *** 0.4279 *** 
  (0.0286) (0.0318) (0.0226)  (0.0246) (0.0314 ) (0.0233 ) 
occupation 3  0.2430*** 0.2255*** 0.2159***  0.2291*** 0.3143 *** 0.2713 *** 
  (0.0237) (0.0239) (0.0160)  (0.0197) (0.0235 ) (0.0174 ) 
occupation 4  0.1144*** 0.1398*** 0.1090***  0.1529*** 0.3115 *** 0.2410 *** 
  (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0161)  (0.0210) (0.0247 ) (0.0179 ) 
occupation 5  0.1826*** 0.1680*** 0.1529***  0.0624** 0.1943 *** 0.1384 *** 
  (0.0282) (0.0287) (0.0189)  (0.0222) (0.0274 ) (0.0196 ) 
occupation 6  0.0609 0.0861 0.0488  -0.0841 0.0941 0.0346 
  (0.0451) (0.0483) (0.0350)  (0.0585) (0.0741 ) (0.0515 ) 
ocupation 7  0.0470* 0.0898*** 0.0517***  0.0319 0.1202 *** 0.0678 ** 
  (0.0225) (0.0223) (0.0143)  (0.0272) (0.0324 ) (0.0236 ) 
occupation 8  0.1050*** 0.1292*** 0.0926***  0.0534 0.1954 *** 0.1387 *** 
  (0.0237) (0.0234) (0.0152)  (0.0292) (0.0342 ) (0.0230 ) 
occupation 9  0.3317*** 0.2949*** 0.3039***  0.0928 0.2288 0.1868 
  (0.0404) (0.0415) (0.0260)  (0.1404) (0.1698 ) (0.1647 ) 
economic activity 1  0.1546*** 0.2178*** 0.2000***  0.0146 0.2090 *** 0.1284 *** 
  (0.0337) (0.0353) (0.0248)  (0.0358) (0.0438 ) (0.0352 ) 
economic activity 2  0.1613*** 0.1725*** 0.1762***  0.0255 0.1777 ** 0.0914 
  (0.0355) (0.0376) (0.0258)  (0.0550) (0.0669 ) (0.0544 ) 
economic activity 3  0.0717* 0.1175** 0.0831**  -0.0388 0.1476 ** 0.0573 
  (0.0365) (0.0381) (0.0268)  (0.0364) (0.0458 ) (0.0360 ) 
economic activity 4  -0.0550 0.0389 -0.0402  -0.0704 0.0472 0.0051 
  (0.0499) (0.0505) (0.0373)  (0.0416) (0.0514 ) (0.0411 ) 
economic activity 5  0.2191*** 0.2667*** 0.2459***  0.1390** 0.2317 *** 0.2079 *** 
  (0.0369) (0.0391) (0.0271)  (0.0440) (0.0539 ) (0.0429 ) 
economic activity 6  0.3862*** 0.4196*** 0.4031***  0.2565*** 0.2645 *** 0.2778 *** 
  (0.0450) (0.0457) (0.0326)  (0.0416) (0.0508 ) (0.0420 ) 
economic activity 7  0.0594 0.1018* 0.0806**  -0.0610 0.1271 ** 0.0450 
  (0.0402) (0.0415) (0.0297)  (0.0377) (0.0460 ) (0.0371 ) 
economic activity 8  0.1499*** 0.2660*** 0.2153***  0.1171** 0.3418 *** 0.2360 *** 
  (0.0364) (0.0382) (0.0263)  (0.0372) (0.0446 ) (0.0356 ) 
economic activity 9  0.1594*** 0.2651** 0.2239***  0.1681*** 0.3900 *** 0.3290 *** 
  (0.0420) (0.0452) (0.0306)  (0.0347) (0.0431 ) (0.0347 ) 
economic activity 10  0.2519*** 0.2814*** 0.2688***  0.0891* 0.2556 *** 0.1987 *** 
  (0.0390) (0.0422) (0.0298)  (0.0359) (0.0439 ) (0.0357 ) 
economic activity 11  0.1693*** 0.1226** 0.1380***  -0.0584 0.0718 0.0140 
  (0.0372) (0.0388) (0.0282)  (0.0349) (0.0430 ) (0.0357 ) 
north  0.1151*** 0.1429*** 0.1292***  0.0621*** 0.1420 *** 0.1066 *** 
  (0.0124) (0.0127) (0.0085)  (0.0125) (0.0153 ) (0.0111 ) 
center  0.0612*** 0.0993*** 0.0844***  0.0386** 0.0810 *** 0.0587 *** 
  (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0097)  (0.0141) (0.0171 ) (0.0125 ) 
constant  1.9442*** 1.4466*** 1.6546***  2.1572*** 1.0379 *** 1.5846 *** 
  (0.0520) (0.0533) (0.0391)  (0.0439) (0.0533 ) (0.0441 ) 
Note: The label Φ+1 column contains the estimated coefficients of the log-wage quantile model of the order Φ+1 ≅ 0.841. The 
label Φ−1 column contains the estimated coefficients of the log-wage quantile model of the order Φ−1 ≅ 0.159. The OLS 
label contains the estimated coefficients of the log-wage model (2), which are estimated by means of OLS. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Occupations: 1 legislators, senior officials and managers; 2 professionals; 3 technicians and associated professionals; 4 
clerks; 5 service workers and shop and market sales workers; 6 skilled agricultural and fishery workers; 7 craft and related trades 
workers; 8 plant and machine operators and assemblers; 9 armed forces. The reference for the occupation dummy set is elementary 
occupations. Economic activities: 1 industry; 2 construction; 3 wholesale, retail trade and repair; 4 hotels and restaurants; 5 transport, 
storage and communications; 6 financial intermediation; 7 real estate, renting and business activities; 8 public administration and 
defence, compulsory social security; 9 education; 10 health and social work; 11 other activities. The reference for the economic 
activities dummy set is agriculture, hunting and forestry. 
 Table 2 – Estimated standard deviation of the erratic component of the log-wage equation for various
combinations of regressor values (full models) 
      kj"l#  kj"z# 
 education experience job region  men women  men women 
1 L L A north  0.239 0.231  0.249 0.252 
2 L L A south  0.253 0.271  0.267 0.295 
3 L L B north  0.212 0.208  0.239 0.207 
4 L L B south  0.226 0.248  0.258 0.250 
5 L L C north  0.459 0.434  0.454 0.453 
6 L L C south  0.473 0.474  0.471 0.492 
7 L H A north  0.237 0.200  0.240 0.232 
8 L H A south  0.251 0.240  0.257 0.275 
9 L H B north  0.210 0.177  0.227 0.188 
10 L H B south  0.224 0.217  0.245 0.230 
11 L H C north  0.457 0.403  0.445 0.436 
12 L H C south  0.471 0.443  0.461 0.474 
13 H L A north  0.272 0.244  0.276 0.263 
14 H L A south  0.286 0.284  0.293 0.307 
15 H L B north  0.245 0.220  0.263 0.219 
16 H L B south  0.259 0.260  0.281 0.262 
17 H L C north  0.493 0.446  0.481 0.464 
18 H L C south  0.506 0.486  0.497 0.503 
19 H H A north  0.270 0.213  0.269 0.243 
20 H H A south  0.284 0.253  0.284 0.287 
21 H H B north  0.243 0.189  0.253 0.200 
22 H H B south  0.257 0.229  0.270 0.242 
23 H H C north  0.270 0.213  0.269 0.243 
24 H H C south  0.284 0.253  0.284 0.287 
Note: L (H) stands for low level variable (high level variable), that is, the sample mean value of variable minus (plus) one sample 
standard deviation (mean and standard deviation are calculated separately by gender). A job is a combination of occupation and 
economic activity as follows: job A = “Occupation: plant and machine operators and assemblers; Economic activity: industry”; job B 
= “occupation: clerks; economic activity: public administration and defence, compulsory social security”; Job C = “occupation: 
legislators, senior officials and managers, economic activity: industry”. The value for weekly worked hours has been set to the mean 
value of the whole sample, that is, the sample including male and female workers. The values kj"l# and kj"z# are estimates of the 
standard deviations of the erratic component of log-wage equations, conditional on different combinations of regressor values. The 
estimate kj"l# is obtained as 1/2m$gno\"#|'( − $gn[\"#|'(p. The estimate kj"z# is the standard deviation based on the 
simulated conditional log-wage distribution. 
 
Table 3 – Index of discrimination   for different values of aversion parameter  by education, work 
experience and region (full models) 
   Italy north  center south 
Education   exp ≤5 exp>5 Tot.  exp≤5 exp>5 Tot.  exp≤5 exp>5 Tot. exp ≤5 exp>5 Tot.
  
    primary r=1  0.115 0.188 0.181 0.126 0.195 0.191 0.099 0.200 0.186 0.118 0.164 0.160
 r=2  0.130 0.198 0.192 0.136 0.200 0.196 0.109 0.209 0.196 0.146 0.186 0.182
 r=3  0.144 0.208 0.203 0.146 0.205 0.201 0.119 0.219 0.205 0.173 0.207 0.204
 r=4  0.158 0.218 0.213 0.155 0.209 0.205 0.129 0.228 0.214 0.198 0.227 0.225
  
    
secondary r=1  0.114 0.157 0.150 0.114 0.165 0.157 0.123 0.167 0.159 0.101 0.122 0.118
 r=2  0.118 0.158 0.151 0.114 0.162 0.154 0.130 0.170 0.163 0.114 0.129 0.126
 r=3  0.122 0.158 0.152 0.112 0.159 0.151 0.136 0.173 0.166 0.127 0.135 0.134
 r=4  0.126 0.158 0.152 0.111 0.156 0.148 0.142 0.176 0.170 0.139 0.141 0.141
  
    
tertiary r=1  0.095 0.131 0.123 0.109 0.141 0.135 0.112 0.143 0.136 0.062 0.099 0.090
 r=2  0.095 0.128 0.120 0.102 0.133 0.127 0.115 0.142 0.136 0.066 0.102 0.093
 r=3  0.094 0.124 0.118 0.096 0.125 0.119 0.117 0.141 0.135 0.071 0.104 0.096
 r=4  0.093 0.120 0.114 0.089 0.117 0.111 0.120 0.139 0.135 0.075 0.107 0.099
  
    Total  r=1  0.110 0.155 0.147 0.114 0.163 0.155 0.120 0.164 0.156 0.091 0.120 0.114
 r=2  0.113 0.155 0.147 0.112 0.160 0.152 0.126 0.167 0.159 0.102 0.128 0.122
 r=3  0.116 0.155 0.148 0.110 0.156 0.149 0.131 0.169 0.162 0.112 0.134 0.130
 r=4  0.119 0.155 0.149 0.108 0.153 0.145 0.137 0.172 0.165 0.123 0.141 0.137
      
Note: exp stands for years of work experience. . is the aversion parameter. 
Source: Authors’ calculation on the Eu-Silc 2006 Italian data set 
 
Table 4 – Share of second order, stochastically dominated women (full models) 
  Italy north  center south 
education  exp ≤5 exp>5 Tot.  exp≤5 exp>5 Tot.  exp≤5 exp>5 Tot. exp ≤5 exp>5 Tot.
primary  0.719 0.702 0.704 0.583 0.614 0.612 0.818 0.681 0.700 0.778 0.879 0.870
secondary  0.471 0.438 0.444 0.348 0.349 0.349 0.551 0.532 0.535 0.653 0.579 0.594
tertiary  0.270 0.370 0.348 0.193 0.289 0.269 0.378 0.405 0.399 0.280 0.485 0.433
Total .  0.432 0.442 0.440 0.322 0.355 0.350 0.521 0.516 0.517 0.552 0.583 0.577
Note: exp stands for years of work experience 
Source: Authors’ calculation on the Eu-Silc 2006 Italian data set 
 
Table 5 – Estimation of regression model coefficients (reduced models) 
  men  women 
 Φ+1 Φ−1 OLS  Φ+1  Φ−1 OLS 
education  0.0584*** 0.0371*** 0.0485***  0.0666*** 0.0476 *** 0.0559 *** 
  (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0012)  (0.0023) (0.0018 ) (0.0014 ) 
experience  0.0308*** 0.0341*** 0.0342***  0.0252*** 0.0320 *** 0.0308 *** 
  (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0014)  (0.0028) (0.0022 ) (0.0019 ) 
experience (squared)  -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0005***  -0.0003*** -0.0005 *** -0.0004 *** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0001) (0.0001 ) (0.0001 ) 
north  0.1010*** 0.1719*** 0.1217***  -0.0121 0.1661 *** 0.0779 *** 
  (0.0128) (0.0115) (0.0091)  (0.0188) (0.0162 ) (0.0128 ) 
center  0.0568*** 0.1186*** 0.0739***  -0.0295 0.0769 *** 0.0270 
  (0.0151) (0.0135) (0.0107)  (0.0214) (0.0184 ) (0.0144 ) 
constant  1.5347*** 1.0760*** 1.2853***  1.4811*** 0.8785 *** 1.1573 *** 
  (0.0289) (0.0223) (0.0198)  (0.0410) (0.0323 ) (0.0260 ) 
Note: The label Φ+1 column contains the estimated coefficients of the log-wage quantile model of the order Φ+1 ≅ 0.841. The
label Φ−1 column contains the estimated coefficients of the log-wage quantile model of order Φ−1 ≅ 0.159. The OLS label 
column contains the estimated coefficients of the log-wage model (2), which are estimated by means of OLS. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
Source: Authors’ calculation on the Eu-Silc 2006 Italian data set 
 
Table 6 – Treiman-Hartman decomposition of gender wage differential by occupation and sector of 
economic activity 
  occupational analysis 
  decomposition A decomposition B 
  Italy north center south Italy north center south
inter-occupational component  -0.516 -0.321 -0.493 -0.876 -0.695 -0.439 -0.568 -1.415
intra-occupational component  1.157 1.340 1.433 0.649 1.336 1.458 1.508 1.188
gender wage differential  0.641 1.018 0.940 -0.227 0.641 1.018 0.940 -0.227
 
          
 
 sector analysis 
 
 Decomposition A Decomposition B 
 
 Italy north center south Italy north center south
inter-sector component  -1.164 -1.130 -1.234 -1.433 -0.663 -0.585 -0.672 -0.868
intra-sector component  1.806 2.148 2.174 1.206 1.304 1.604 1.612 0.640
gender wage differential  0.641 1.018 0.940 -0.227 0.641 1.018 0.940 -0.227
Note: Wages are expressed in euros. Occupations used in the analysis are: legislators, senior officials and managers; professionals; 
technicians and associate professionals; clerks; service workers and shop and market sales workers; skilled agricultural and fishery 
workers; craft and related trades workers; plant and machine operators and assemblers; elementary occupations; the armed forces. 
Economic activities used in the analysis are: agriculture, hunting and forestry ; industry; construction; wholesale, retail trade and 
repair; Hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and communication; financial intermediation; real estate, renting and business 
activities; public administration and defence, compulsory social security; education; health and social work. 
Source: Author’s calculation on the Eu-Silc 2006 Italian data set 
 
 
Table 7 – Estimated standard deviation of the erratic component of the log-wage equation for various
combinations of regressor values (reduced models) 
     kj"l#  kj"z# 
 education experience region  men women  men women 
1 L L north  0.264 0.277  0.273 0.334 
2 L L south  0.299 0.366  0.316 0.430 
3 L H north  0.276 0.267  0.282 0.332 
4 L H south  0.311 0.356  0.324 0.428 
5 H L north  0.343 0.347  0.344 0.375 
6 H L south  0.378 0.436  0.386 0.471 
7 H H north  0.355 0.337  0.354 0.373 
8 H H south  0.390 0.426  0.396 0.469 
Note: L (H) stands for low level variable (high level variable), that is, a sample mean value of variable minus (plus) one sample 
standard deviation (mean and standard deviation are calculated separately by gender). The values kj"l# and kj"z# are estimates of the 
standard deviations of the erratic component of the log-wage equations, conditional on various combinations of regressor values. The 
estimate kj"l# is obtained as 1/2m$gno\"#|'( − $gn[\"#|'(p. The estimate kj"z# is the standard deviation based on the 
simulated conditional log-wage distribution. 
Source: Authors’ calculation on the Eu-Silc 2006 Italian data set 
 
Table 8 – Index of discrimination   for different values of aversion parameter  by education, work 
experience and region (reduced models) 
   Italy north  center south 
education   exp ≤5 exp>5 Tot.  exp≤5 exp>5 Tot.  exp≤5 exp>5 Tot. exp ≤5 exp>5 Tot.
  
    primary r=1  0.127 0.133 0.133 0.138 0.143 0.142 0.137 0.146 0.144 0.099 0.106 0.106
 r=2  0.135 0.137 0.137 0.140 0.141 0.141 0.146 0.151 0.150 0.115 0.119 0.119
 r=3  0.143 0.141 0.141 0.142 0.140 0.140 0.154 0.157 0.156 0.132 0.131 0.131
 r=4  0.152 0.145 0.145 0.144 0.138 0.138 0.163 0.162 0.162 0.148 0.144 0.144
  
    
secondary r=1  0.081 0.100 0.096 0.089 0.107 0.104 0.091 0.109 0.106 0.050 0.064 0.061
 r=2  0.088 0.102 0.099 0.089 0.103 0.101 0.100 0.114 0.112 0.068 0.078 0.076
 r=3  0.094 0.103 0.102 0.089 0.100 0.098 0.109 0.120 0.118 0.087 0.092 0.091
 r=4  0.100 0.105 0.104 0.088 0.096 0.095 0.118 0.125 0.124 0.105 0.105 0.105
  
    
tertiary r=1  0.033 0.050 0.046 0.046 0.060 0.057 0.050 0.063 0.060 0.002 0.017 0.013
 r=2  0.041 0.051 0.049 0.043 0.053 0.051 0.058 0.067 0.065 0.022 0.031 0.029
 r=3  0.048 0.052 0.051 0.040 0.046 0.044 0.067 0.071 0.070 0.041 0.045 0.044
 r=4  0.055 0.053 0.054 0.037 0.039 0.038 0.076 0.075 0.075 0.060 0.059 0.059
  
    
total  r=1  0.072 0.093 0.089 0.082 0.102 0.099 0.083 0.102 0.099 0.038 0.058 0.054
 r=2  0.078 0.095 0.092 0.081 0.098 0.095 0.092 0.107 0.104 0.057 0.072 0.068
 r=3  0.085 0.097 0.095 0.080 0.094 0.092 0.101 0.112 0.110 0.075 0.085 0.083
 r=4  0.091 0.099 0.097 0.079 0.090 0.088 0.110 0.117 0.116 0.094 0.099 0.098
      
Note: exp stands for years of work experience. . is the aversion parameter. 
Source: Authors’ calculation on the Eu-Silc 2006 Italian data set. 
 
Table 9 – Second order, stochastically dominated share of women (reduced models) 
  Italy north  center south 
education  exp ≤5 exp>5 Tot.  exp≤5 exp>5 Tot.  exp≤5 exp>5 Tot. exp ≤5 exp>5 Tot.
primary  1.000 0.512 0.556 1.000 0.042 0.107 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
secondary  0.668 0.440 0.480 0.344 0.000 0.056 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.998
tertiary  0.274 0.439 0.403 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.665 0.495
Tot.  0.588 0.444 0.470 0.290 0.003 0.050 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.717 0.927 0.884
Note: exp stands for years of work experience. 
Source: Authors’ calculation on the Eu-Silc 2006 Italian data set 
 
Figures 
Figure 1 - Standardized normal probability plots for male log-wage distributions, conditional on 
various combinations of regressor values (full models) 
 
Note: For explanatory notes relating to the chose combinations of regressor values (combinations 1-24), see Table 7. 
Source: Authors’ calculation on the Eu-Silc 2006 Italian data set 
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 Figure 2 - Standardized normal probability plots for female log-wage distributions, conditional on 
various combinations of regressor values (full models) 
 
Note: For explanatory notes relating to the chose combinations of regressor values (combinations 1-24), see Table 2. 
Source: Author’s calculation on the Eu-Silc 2006 italian data set. 
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Figure 3 - Standardized normal probability plots for simulated male log-wage distributions, 
conditional on to various regressor combinations (reduced models) 
 
Note: For explanatory notes relating to the chose combinations of regressor values (combinations 1-24), see Table 7. 
Source: Authors’ calculation on the Eu-Silc 2006 Italian data set 
 
Figure 4 - Standardized normal probability plots for female log-wage distributions, conditional on 
various regressor combinations (reduced models) 
 
Note: For explanatory notes relating to the chose combinations of regressor values (combinations 1-24), see Table 7. 
Source: Authors’ calculation on the Eu-Silc 2006 Italian data set 
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Figure 5 – Female representation ratio and male mean wage by occupation and sector of economic 
activity 
  
Note: Occupations are: 1 legislators, senior officials and managers; 2 professionals; technicians and associate professionals; 3 clerks; 
4 service workers and shop and market sales workers; 5 skilled agricultural and fishery workers; 6 craft and related trades workers; 7 
plant and machine operators and assemblers; 8 elementary occupations;9 the armed forces. Economic activities include: 1 agriculture, 
hunting and forestry; 2 industry; construction; 3 wholesale, retail trade and repair; 4 hotels and restaurants; 5 transport, storage and 
communication; 6 financial intermediation; 7 real estate, renting and business activities; 8 public administration and defence, 
compulsory social security; 9 education; 10 health and social work. 
Source: Authors’ calculation on the Eu-Silc 2006 Italian data set 
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